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Building Contractor's Liability After Completion
and Acceptance
James Jay Brown*
The person who designedly or unwittingly constructs a trap
which will injure innocent passersby cannot escape liability for his
wrong by asserting that he has left the premises or no longer con-
trols the injurious engine he abandoned to trusting mankind....
Where a builder creates a hazard which, without the need of a
prophetic telescope, proclaims potential injury to the public, he may
not plead immunity from liability for resulting damage on the basis
that his responsibility ceased with the insertion of the last bolt and
the driving of the final nail."
T HIS STATEMENT SYMBOLIZES a judicial attitude which is carefully, but
certainly, making the independent contractor, the builder-vendor,
and the sub-contractor liable for personal injury and property damage
proximately caused by their negligent construction. It is generally
stated2 that the once unanimous rule of contractor's non-liability follow-
ing completion and acceptance is in retreat before the alleged majority
rule3 of liability founded on the Cardozo decision in the MacPherson
case.4 Whether the majority trend now or not, this expanding area is an
extension of tort concepts into the hallowed jurisdiction of property law
and, as such, warrants concentration best begun with a well-reasoned
penetrating decision.
Such a decision is Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,5 which held that
a tract home-builder must defend his actions against the prima facie case
established by an injured third party. This cause of action, founded on
negligent construction, alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in de-
signing and installing the domestic hot water system so as to avoid an
unreasonable risk of harm to others. It was clearly established that the
defendant's acts were the proximate cause of a small child's severe scald-
ing two years after completion of the particular house.
The importance of this case lies in the application of a tort doctrine,
previously applied exclusively to negligent acts by chattel manufactur-
*Of the Cleveland Bar.
1 Prost v. Caldwell Store, Inc., 409 Pa. 421, 187 A. 2d 273, 276-277 (1963).
2 27 Am. Jur., Independent Contractors, § 55 (Supp. 1966). See generally 65 C. J. S.,
Negligence § 95b (1966).
3 Prosser, Torts, § 99 at 695 (3d ed. 1964).
4 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 100, L. R. A. 1916 F, 696
(1916).
5 44 N. J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314 (1965). This case is fully analyzed in a subsequent
section.
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ers,6 to real property construction.7 This extension is shattering the an-
cient property concepts so much the bedrock of our Common Law.
We will review that foundation and the old rules of non-liability as
they concern the landowner, contractor, and third party,8 in order to
grasp the significance of this new change in jurisprudential thought.
From there, we will analyze Ohio's reliance on the old and possible
adoption of the new.
Historical Foundation
A. Third Party v. Landowner
The long-standing rule that during the course of construction the
injured third party cannot proceed against the owner-contractee for the
negligent acts of his hired independent contractor, 9 thus casting a veil of
immunity over the contractee, is a mere reflection of the preferred status
landowners have had since earliest times. That status constituted nearly
a sanctified position in the hierarchy of legal preference. English Com-
mon Law granted preference to property ownership through an "abso-
lute right," one of three in the law, which was so great a right that the
courts refused to "authorize the least violation of it... even for the gen-
eral good of the whole community." 10 This status has been upheld for
6 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 5.02 [5] at 54.6 (1964).
' Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra n. 5, at 321. The chattel manufacturing
process is comparable to the acts of a builder. He designs the system, assembles the
parts, installs them, and then offers his completed package for sale to the public.
8 The Common Law concepts have become so overlapped and calcified that only
through inventive exceptions have the innocently injured received that compensa-
tion demanded under modern society's recognition of the individual's rights.
9 Fleming, The Law of Torts, § 416 (2d ed. 1961). This general rule has gradually
become a framework for a long list of liability-imposing exceptions, which, in effect,
indicates the judiciary's concern for individual rights. Restatement, Torts §§ 410-415
(1934).
Comment, 30 Tenn. L. Rev. 439 (1963) has a convenient, carefully documented
grouping of these exceptions. The first involves the landowner-contractee's active
negligence in such areas as exercising reasonable care when giving orders for his
contractor-employee's work, and in providing precautions against recognizable dan-
gers. The second group concerns non-delegable duties such as preventing harm to
adjoining property owners; a city keeping its streets in repair; an employer provid-
ing a safe working place; and a vendor keeping his premises reasonably safe for
business visitors. The third covers inherent dangers including extra-hazardous ac-
tivities (blasting, spraying insecticides) and nuisances. The last group includes
liability for collateral negligence, which, as a jury question, concerns whether the
contractor acted outside the scope of his employment thereby raising the issue of
foreseeability of unreasonable risk of harm to others. Should the acts be outside of
the scope of employment, the owner-contractee has a valid defense against liability.
In Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp., 57 Cal. 2d 407, 369 P. 2d 708, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12
(1962), a property owning corporation-contractee was held liable to an employee
of its independent contractor for failing to take safety precautions with work which
was recognizable as containing an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.
For a comprehensive analysis of contractee-owner's Ohio immunity for torts of
his independent contractor during the course of employment, see Blattner, Employer
Immunity in Independent Contractor Torts in Ohio, 9 Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 287 (1960).
10 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *138. See also 2 Harper & James, Torts § 27.2 at
1434 (1956), where the authors refer to the English Court's ". . . overzealous desire
to safeguard the right of ownership as it was regarded under a system of landed
estates . . ."; Comment, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 485, 486 (1964).
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CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY AFTER ACCEPTANCE
such academic reasons as the fact of possession, which carries with it
the right to exclude others," and the vested right to control any activity
thereon.' 2
Although the landowner has a preferred position, it has been whit-
tled away by exceptions under the terminology of "duty," i.e., to keep
one's property in repair. A public utility with a building fronting on a
sidewalk was found liable for failing to have its display window ade-
quately installed and braced, and for failing to inspect its property peri-
odically, which were its duties to pedestrians. 13 Under a recent decision,14
a building owner-lessor who retained control of the premises not only
had a duty of repair but also the responsibility for the use of due care
by his contractor during any repair. In connection therewith, he has the
co-related duty to warn of inherent dangers, defects, and potentially
harmful conditions existent within or around the working area.15 The
contractor must be adequately apprised of the risks and danger 16 and/or
be sufficiently warned under a reasonable review of all the circum-
stances. 17 It is such standards of care which reduce the owner's veil of
immunity if the injured party fits within the duty class.
The other "duties," breach of which may open an avenue for recov-
ery, concern us at this point.
11 Green v. Manveg Properties, Inc., 126 Cal. 2d 1, 271 P. 2d 544 (1954); Starits v.
Avery, 204 Iowa 401, 213 N. W. 769 (1927).
12 United States v. Fox, 60 F. 2d 685 (2d Cir. 1932); Wittkop v. Garner, 4 N. J. Misc.
235, 132 A. 339 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
13 "The owner of the building abutting a public highway, which includes a public
sidewalk, must exercise reasonable care not to endanger the safety of persons
lawfully using the public way. While the owner or person in control of the
building is not an insurer, he is bound to use reasonable care and skill in the
construction and maintenance of the building, which includes the duty to inspect
from time to time." Lee v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 20 Wis. 2d 333, 122 N. W.
2d 374, 378 (1963); Accord, Majestic Realty Corp. v. Brandt, 198 Wis. 527, 224
N. W. 743 (1929); where owner has the added duty of periodic inspection: Smith
v. Earl D. Hanson, Inc., 9 (N. Y.) Misc. 2d 244, 170 N. Y. S. 2d 866 (1957);
Feeney v. New York Waist Co., 105 Conn. 647, 136 A. 554, 50 A. L. R. 1539 (1927).
14 Joint defendants-owner, general contractor, and roofing sub-contractor-were
held liable for water damage to tenant's merchandise. Poulsen v. Charlton, 224 Cal.
App. 2d 262, 36 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1964).
15 Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 284 (1961). To determine the reasonableness of defendant-
landowner's acts of warning his contractor and employees of the dangers, courts ask
whether he surrendered or retained actual control over the premises during the
construction; whether there were moderate costs involved in providing safer modes
of work; whether the warning went to the single general contractor or his sub-
contractors as well as employees; and whether the work itself was inherently dan-
gerous.
For modern treatment of employer-contractee's liability under exceptions to
general rule of non-liability for negligence of independent contractor see, Note, 44
N. C. L. Rev. 242 (1965).
16 Paul v. Staten Island Edison Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 311, 155 N. Y. S. 2d 427 (1956);
Larkin v. New York Telephone Co., 220 N. Y. 27, 114 N. E. 1043 (1917); Sadler v.
Lynch, 192 Va. 344, 64 S. E. 2d 664 (1951).
17 Schwarz v. General Electric Realty Corp., 163 Ohio St. 354, 126 N. E. 2d 906 (1955);
Storum v. New York Telephone Co., 270 N. Y. 103, 200 N. E. 659 (1936).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1967
16 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
Following completion and acceptance of any work, repairs included,
the law imposes a "duty of care" to trespassers,"' licensees, and invitees.
The occupier-owner owes the licensee a duty to warn of concealed dan-
gerous conditions of which he has knowledge, but he is under no duty to
inspect the premises or take special precautions for safety.19 An invitee
possesses the right to be informed about dangerous conditions the owner
knows about or could have discovered with reasonable care, and the
right to expect that the premises will be reasonably safe.20 In effect, the
owner must fulfill his duty of discovering unsafe conditions, keeping
them repaired, or issuing a warning about their existence and taking
whatever precautionary measures are necessary. To determine whether
the owner has breached his duty to an invitee, the courts have devised
the economic benefit test,21 which includes, inter alia, the hired independ-
ent contractor,22 and the invitation test, wherein if the person remains
within the reasonable boundaries of the area over which his invitation
extended, he may safely presume that the area has been arranged for his
safety.23 However, none of the foregoing makes the owner an insurer of
any invitee's safety.24
Neither of the above tests lends itself to an easy determination of
activity areas over which the landowner's duties extend.2 5 An even
greater uncertainty arises where the distinctions between invitee and
licensee are obliterated by a decision evolving a different duty concept.
18 Prosser, Torts § 76 at 432 (2d ed. 1955).
19 2 Harper & James, Torts, § 27.1 at 1431 (1956). See generally, Prosser, Torts § 60
at 385 (3d ed. 1964).
20 Prosser, Torts § 78 (2d ed. 1955).
21 Restatement, Torts § 332 comment b (1934); 2 Harper & James, Torts § 27.12
(1956).
22 Wohlfron v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 238 App. Div. 463, 265 N. Y. S. 18 (1933),
aff'd. 263 N. Y. 547, 189 N. E. 691 (1933); Contra, where a contractor knowingly
accepts employment to repair a defective structure, Kowalsky v. Conreco, 264 N. Y.
125, 190 N. E. 260 (1954).
For general discussion of landowner's liability for construction and repairs, see:
Koerner, Owner-Contractorship Liability in Building Construction and Repair Cases,
5 N. Y. L. Forum 73 (1959).
During the course of any construction work, where its nature requires the
owner to exercise supervision over his contractor, the owner becomes vicariously
liable for injurious acts by the contractor's employees toward pedestrians, visitors,
or tenants. Tipaldi v. Riverside Memorial Chapel, 273 App. Div. 414, 78 N. Y. S. 2d
12 (1948), aff'd. 298 N. Y. 686, 82 N. E. 2d 585 (1948). Such liability is more nearly
strict where the nature of the work involves a nondelegable duty (e.g. explosives on
premises; elevator maintenance), Koerner, supra n. 22 at 76.
23 Comment, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 485 (1964).
24 Koehler v. Grace Line, Inc., 285 App. Div., 154, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 87 (1954). See
also, Busler v. Cut Rate Super Market, 47 Tenn. App. 1, 334 S. W. 2d 337 (1960);
Management Services v. Helman, 40 Tenn. App. 127, 142, 289 S. W. 2d 711 (1955).
Merely being injured on the property does not constitute prima facie evidence that
the owner has breached his duty of care. 4 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence § 779
(1941).
25 For an example, see the discussion concerning social guest in Prosser, Torts § 61
at 394-401 (3d ed. 1964).
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Such an example involved elevator repairs, where an independent con-
tractor, not the owner, was charged with breach of duty on the basis of
foreseeability of harm to those third persons who would be considered
elevator users,26 regardless of other status.
Obviously, there are no vested rights in the injured third person
when proceeding against the landowner. So many exceptions and sub-
distinctions have been evolved that each case becomes a major test or
case of first impression, if no precedent exception can be located. Often,
however, an exception must be twisted to fit the plaintiff's search for
recompense; in turn, creating more confusion in an already confusing
area. It is the thesis of this article that such injustice should be elimi-
nated by adoption of the new trend of liability.
B. Third Party v. Contractor-Vendor
The previous analysis of the landowner's immunity applies in full
where the owner is also the contractor and seller, such as a tract home-
builder. He is saved harmless from any liability, whether from danger-
ous conditions existing at the sale or arising thereafter, 27 from the mo-
ment the deed is transferred . 2  This means that neither the vendee nor
a third party has any grounds29 upon which to bring a cause of action for
injury or damage from those dangerous conditions. One reason for this
immunity is that from the moment of transfer the contractor-vendor,
lacking possession or control, is unable to make corrections or repairs of
such conditions.30
26 McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator Co., 230 N. C. 539, 54 S. E. 2d 45 (1949), where a
patient fell through an open elevator door while defendant contractor was doing
repair work.
27 Restatement, Torts § 352 (1934) as to dangerous conditions existing at the time
the grantee-vendee took possession; § 351 as to those coming into existence after
possession is taken.
28 Palmore v. Morris, Tasker & Co., 182 Pa. 82, 37 A. 995 (1897).
29 Unless the vendee carefully inspects the premises and rejects specifically those
conditions he finds to be unsatisfactory, he is divested of that right at the instant of
transfer. Kordig v. Grovedale Oleander Homes, Inc., 18 Ill. App. 2d 48, 151 N. E. 2d
70 (1958); McIntosh v. Goodwin, 40 Tenn. App. 505, 292 S. W. 2d 242 (1954); Com-
bow v. Ground Investment Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S. W. 2d 539 (1949).
This rule of waiver of defects not objected to at the time of acceptance applies
whether vendee purchases a tract-home or has it built to specifications. Guschl v.
Schmidt, 266 Wis. 410, 63 N. W. 2d 759 (1954).
Where a vendee takes possession of a newly-completed house and continues to
live in it for two years prior to personal injury from a patently defective basement
stairway, all rights of recovery against the builder-vendor were lost when acceptance
and possession were completed, even though the vendee made one verbal objection
to said defect two weeks after the deed transfer. Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers,
Inc., 55 N. J. Super. 475, 151 A. 2d 48 (1959).
30 Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 288 P. 2d 90 (1955); McQuillan v. Clark
Thread Co., 12 N. J. Misc. 409, 172 A. 370 (1934).
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C. Third Party v. Hired Contractor
The controlling reason for immunity, which covers this and the
above sub-section, is that where there is no contractual relation flowing
between the third party and the negligent contractor, no breach can
occur, and therefore no right of action can arise.3' Contractual privity
was the reason for a 1964 Virginia decision,32 which discharged plaintiff-
motorist's petition against a negligent sewer contractor but permitted it
against the municipality-contractee. In addition to citing the city for
failing in its affirmative duty of maintaining the public thoroughfares,
the court relied on McCrorey v. Thomas33 which had said:
[T]he independent contractor is not liable for an injury to per-
son or to property of one not a party to the contract, occurring after
the independent contractor has completed the work and turned it
over to the owner or employer, and the same has been accepted by
him, though the injury resulted from the contractor's failure to
properly perform his contract.3 4
Although an unsuccessful attempt was made to hold the sewer contrac-
tor liable under one of the many exceptions 35 to the general rule of non-
liability after completion and acceptance, it is within this area that we
find the modern concern for social welfare and the attempts to cast the
liability where it justly belongs. Only certain exceptions will be men-
tioned as a means of illustrating the pains taken to get out of the Com-
mon Law straitjacket.
The vendor-contractor is liable for his failure to disclose a known
dangerous condition or failure to realize that the vendee did not know
or probably would not discover the condition or its potentiality for
harm.3 6
31 Prosser, Torts § 85 (2d ed. 1955).
32 City of Richmond v. Branch, 205 Va. 424, 137 S. E. 2d 882 (1964) where motorist
became stuck in a deep depression where the sewer contractor had recently com-
pleted and refilled his excavation work for the city.
33 109 Va. 373, 379, 63 S. E. 1011, 1013 (1909).
34 City of Richmond v. Branch, supra n. 32 at 885. A clear statement of the old rule
prior to Hanna v. Fletcher: Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App. D. C. 361, 14 F. 2d 253, 52 A.L.R.
619 (1926), certified question dismissed per curiam, 266 U. S. 584, 45 Sup. Ct. 124,
which held that (1) after a building is completed and accepted, the liability of the
builder-contractor for accidents caused by defective construction ceased and at-
tached to the owner-contractee, whether the damage was the result of the owner's
or builder's negligence; (2) such a conclusion was a decree of sound public policy
designed to prevent endless litigation; (3) that generally it was the negligence of
the owner in maintaining the building, and not of the builder in constructing it,
which was the proximate cause of the injury to the third party.
35 The court referred to the inherent or imminent danger exception but held that
the factual situation failed to qualify as such. City of Richmond v. Branch, supra
n. 32 at 886. For list of exceptions see 27 Am. Jur., Independent Contractors, Sec. 56.
36 "A vendor of land, who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition
whether natural or artificial involving unreasonable risk to persons upon the land, is
subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby to the vendee and others upon
the land with the consent of the vendee or his sub-vendee, after the vendee has
taken possession, if (Continued on next page)
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Generally, the liability of a grantor of real property for the dan-
gerous or defective condition of the premises ceases upon the trans-
fer of possession and control, regardless of whether the person in-
jured is the transferee, or some third person to whom a duty of care
is owed .... The rule is subject to the qualification that, if the grant-
or knows of a latent defect or danger on the premises, and misleads
the transferee into believing the premises are safe, or fails to dis-
close the defect when he has reason to believe that it will not be dis-
covered by him, he may nevertheless be liable for any injury result-
ing therefrom.37
This exception has grown in importance with each case because it cre-
ates an affirmative duty of disclosure; one which shatters the veil of im-
munity, to the benefit of society.
Another exception states that a hired contractor is not liable when
he follows the plans and specifications furnished by his employer-
contractee where they are not so obviously defective or dangerous that
no reasonable man would follow them.38 The law presumes that the con-
tractee has assumed responsibility for them, and any resultant injury
proximately caused by defects in those plans is the contractee's liability.
(Continued from preceding page)
(a) the vendee does not know of the condition or the risk involved therein, and
(b) the vendor knows of the condition and the risk involved therein and has
reason to believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the
risk."
Restatement, Torts § 353 (1934). Accord, Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc., 55
N. J. Super. 475, 151 A. 2d 48, 52 (1959). See also 2 Harper & James, Law of Torts
§ 27.18 at 1520 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 62 at 409 (3d ed. 1964).
The first case to adopt the position which finally became Restatement, Torts
§ 353 above was Kilmer v. White, 254 N. Y. 64, 171 N. E. 908 (1930).
In McCabe v. Cohen, 294 N. Y. 522, 63 N. E. 2d 88 (1945), a vendor was held
liable for concealing the known condition of a rusted-out fire escape. This decision
approved and followed Pharm v. Lituchy, 283 N. Y. 130, 27 N. E. 2d 811 (1940).
87 U. S. v. Inmon, 205 F. 2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1953).
38 Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P. 2d 33 (1965).
See also Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F. 2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. den.
341 U. S. 936, 71 Sup. Ct. 855 (1951); Trustees of the First Baptist Church of Corinth
v. McElroy, 223 Miss. 327, 78 So. 2d 138 (1955); Tipton v. Clower, 67 N. M. 388, 356
P. 2d 46, 49 (1960), which restated the plans and specifications exception plus an
additional one which makes the owner liable if he discovers the danger or it is
obvious to him. This court went on to state that the application of these exceptions
had to be tempered with consideration of the status of the injured third party,
whether invitee or licensee. Campbell v. Barnett, 351 F. 2d 342 (10th Cir. 1965),
approved and followed the second exception in the Tipton decision.
The Leininger case held the defendant exhaust fan manufacturer not liable for
an explosion within the device while an employee of the mining company was dis-
mantling it. Four years preceding this mishap, the company had hired the defendant
to install an exhaust system in compliance with the company's plans. Because of
the company's strict direction and control over the project, no issue of reliance upon
a warranty was involved. However, after the evidence disclosed the fact that the
company experienced similar explosions in the years following completion, part of
the court's rationale for its decision was based upon the rule of superseding liability
where an owner-employer discovers the dangerous defect. Such a discovery re-
lieves the contractor-manufacturer of any liability; Prosser, Torts § 85 at 519 (2d
ed. 1955).
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In an action against a paving contractor and municipal contractee,39 by
a pedestrian who tripped over a large projection in a recently black-
topped street, only the contractee was subject to liability. This decision
was grounded upon the facts (1) that where the contractee furnished
the plans and/or materials, and the injury was a result of faults in either,
then the contractor is immune from liability and (2) that nothing in the
case raised issues of inherent defect necessary for application of the
MacPherson Doctrine.
40
In a 1966 New Jersey decision, 41 a public housing authority and its
contractor-grantor were compelled to undergo trial for liability where
a negligently repaired sidewalk, which existed in that condition at the
moment of deed conveyance, was the proximate cause of an injurious fall
five days thereafter by a pedestrian and baby. This was a nuisance,
42
another exception to the general rule,43 which prevented liability from
shifting with the conveyance. 44 The authoritative source material for
this case45 reflects the state's progressiveness in treating injuries which
previously had been irremediable.
New Trend of Liability Through the MacPherson Doctrine
Hot scalding water at 210' emanating from a bathroom sink faucet
was the cause of a minor's injuries which required 74 days of hospital
care plus two skin grafts. For the cost of a $10.00 mixing valve, the
builder-vendor-grantor could have regulated the domestic water level at
1400 while leaving an adequate supply at 2100 for the under-floor radiant
heating system. Apparently the builder was aware of the possible risk
to others, for he equipped his 400 tract homes with common spigot mix-
ing-type fixtures plus a homeowner's manual which advised the buyer
that since his water was hotter than usual, it would be advisable to first
39 Johnson v. City of San Leandro, 179 Cal. App. 2d 794, 4 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1960).
Accord, Barnthouse v. California Steel Buildings Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1963).
40 Johnson v. City, supra n. 39 at 406. The court in this case construed Dow v.
Holly Manufacturing Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P. 2d 736 (1958), in a very strict sense
and refused to extend its theory to this set of facts.
41 Cavanaugh v. Pappas, 91 N. J. Super. 597, 222 A. 2d 34 (1966).
42 Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc., 55 N. J. Super. 475, 151 A. 2d 48 (1959). To
avoid liability, the grantor must abate the nuisance prior to conveyance. Pirozzi v.
Acme Holding Co. of Paterson, 5 N. J. 178, 188, 74 A. 2d 297, 302 (1950).
43 McQuillan v. Clark Thread Co., 12 N. J. Misc. 409, 172 A. 370 (1934).
44 Cavanaugh v. Pappas, supra n. 41 at 38. Accord, Restatement, Torts (Second)
§ 373 (1965); Prosser, Torts § 62 at 409-410 (3d ed. 1964).
45 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 44, and Restatement, op. cit. supra n. 44, wherein is
stated that:
"(1) A vendor of land who has created or negligently permitted to remain on
the land a structure or other artificial condition which involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to others outside of the land, because of its plan, construction,
location, disrepair, or otherwise, is subject to liability to such persons for
physical harm caused by the condition after his vendee has taken possession of
the land."
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turn on the, cold. However, nothing in this manual apprised the reader
of the inherent danger from the extremely high temperature. Whether
this manual was read by guests of the vendee or subsequent vendees
was never open to serious debate.
In a 6-0 decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case of negligence against the
builder-vendor for proximately causing injury to a third person.46 How-
ever, the case was remanded for trial on factual issues regarding instal-
lation.
The plaintiffs urge that the MacPherson principle, imposing
liability for negligence, should be applied to a builder vendor such
as Levitt. We consider their point to be well taken for it is clear to
us that the impelling policy considerations which led to MacPherson
and its implications are equally applicable here. 41
46 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N. J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314 (1965).
4T Id. at 321. The MacPherson Doctrine imposed liability on the manufacturer of a
chattel which, if negligently built, would be foreseeably dangerous to the immediate
vendee and others not in privity of contract, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, LRA 1916 F, 696 (Ct. App. 1916).
"If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger .... If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective
of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully." Id., 217 N. Y. at 389, 111 N. E. at 1053.
Although nearly all states have adopted the MacPherson Doctrine when con-
cerned with manufactured chattels, it was never applied to acts of builder-contrac-
tors or to structures on real property. Comment, 23 Brooklyn L. Rev. 160 (1956);
Comment, 4 St. Louis U. L. J. 344 (1957).
This can be attributed to the Common Law reliance upon Caveat Emptor plus
the rationale that each party to a contract involving real property enters it with
firm bargaining power so that their contract specifically safeguards the rights and
identifies the obligations, one to the other. Also, the longer period of life of the
completed structure may have had an important limiting effect upon creating li-
ability before this period. Note, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 343 (1963). See generally, 1
Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 5.03 [1] & [2] (1960).
It was only recently extended to cover real property construction in Inman v.
Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N. Y. 2d 137, 164 N. Y. S. 2d 699, 704 (1957),
reversing on other grounds, 1 App. Div. 2d 599, 152 N. Y. S. 2d 79, 82 (1956),
"... we conclude that the 'principle inherent' in the MacPherson doctrine
applies to determine the liability of architects or builders for their handiwork.
Id., 164 N. Y. S. 2d at 704. (This court reasoned that there was no logical basis for
distinguishing between liability for chattels or real property structures. That to do
so was a mere mechanical contrivance for withholding liability.)
By the time of this decision, the 1934 Restatement of Torts had been advocating
such a development. See Restatement, Torts §§ 385, 395 (1934).
Of course, Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, was an important step for
New York State. At about the same time, MacPherson was extended in the Federal
Court for the District of Columbia:
"The bridge described in the MacPherson case between the manufacturer of
an article and its third party user, not in privity of contract with the manu-
facturer, is the same as that between a landlord's contractor or repairman and
the tenant of the premises repaired; for in each case negligent conduct often
may be expected to result in injury to one reasonably foreseen as a probable
(Continued on next page)
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In fulfillment of the deliberate design of its system for distribut-
ing hot water for domestic use, Levitt assembled the ingredients,
including the heating unit from York [Mfgr.], and directed their in-
stallation. In this respect it was not unlike the manufacturers of
automobiles, airplanes, etc., whose products embody parts supplied
by others. When their marketed products are defective and cause
injury to either immediate or remote users, such manufacturers may
be held accountable under ordinary negligence principles .... ..
Unmistakably, this is the clearest factual analogy of the building con-
tractor's acts to the manufacturing process. The defendant had acted in
all capacities, i.e., architect, engineer, designer, builder-contractor and
vendor. The analogy is, in actuality, more than what we find in the out-
right examples seen in manufacturer-to-wholesaler transactions.
It'must be clearly understood at this point that the application of the
MacPherson Doctrine can be made only to cases of completed construc-
tion, wherein defective performance and a duty relation are involved. It
cannot be applied to construction in progress.49
The New Jersey court went into analysis of the necessity in plain-
tiff's cause of action of pleading the existence of a latent defect.50 Such
a defect is the sole basis for recovery; 51 without it, only patent defects
remain for which there is no right of recovery against the contractor.
Whether the latent defect element will retain its importance is yet to be
seen, for in the area of manufacturer's liability it has been subject to
severe criticism.5 2 Further analysis included the foreseeability concept,
(Continued from preceding page)
user. Here the tenants were to use the steps, not the landlord, as in Mac-
Pherson, the ultimate purchaser was to use the car, not the dealer." Hanna v.
Fletcher, 97 App. D. C. 310, 231 F. 2d 469, 474, 58 A. L. R. 2d 847 (D. C. C. 1956),
cert. den. 351 U. S. 989, 76 Sup. Ct. 1051 (1956).
In this case, an injured tenant stated a good cause of action for negligent repair and
maintenance of stair railings against the owner-landlord and his repair contractor.
48 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra n. 46 at 321.
49 Dixon v. Simpson, 74 Nev. 358, 332 P. 2d 656 (1959).
50 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra n. 46 at 332.
51 Failure to allege and prove the existence of a latent defect or danger is fatal to
plaintiff's cause of action. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, supra n. 47 at
704; Accord:
"... in cases dealing with a manufacturer's liability for injury to remote
users, the stress has always been upon the duty of guarding against hidden
defects and of giving notice of concealed dangers .... In point of fact, several
of the cases actually declare that a duty is owed, a liability imposed, only if
the defect or danger be not 'known' or 'potent' or discoverable 'by a reasonable
inspection.'" Campo v. Scofield, 301 N. Y. 468, 472-473, 95 N. E. 2d 802, 804
(1950).
Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against a storm door contractor when
he did not allege the existence of a latent defect. Eilenberg v. 0 & M Storm Window
Co., 17 (N. Y.) Misc. 2d 799, 187 N. Y. S. 2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
52 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5, 1542, 1545 (1956). One writer has noted the decline
of reliance on the patent-latent distinction and a greater emphasis toward basing
liability upon acts which create any unreasonable danger. Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L. J. 816, 837-838
(1962).
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which received a new application in Hanna v. Fletcher,3 when the court
remarked:
[I]f (defendant's) repair was so negligently performed as to
cause the railing to become insecure, there arose a probably danger-
ous physical condition. The railing was essential to the safe use by
the tenants of the steps over the area way. Use of the steps would
be reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril unless the rail-
ing was secure. The consequence to the tenants of negligence in re-
pair could be foreseen.
54
This federal decision impliedly rejected the privity of contract concept.55
Although individually the above concepts could control, the New
Jersey court found that, regardless of privity, and whether the
defect/danger was latent or patent, it was foreseeable that serious danger
was involved in defendant's home construction. It noted that "[T]he
obviousness of a danger does not necessarily preclude a jury finding
of unreasonable risk and negligence. . . ." 51 The court distinguished the
normal dangers incident to modern living, such as work in and around
stoves, ovens, electrical appliances, stairways, second-story windows and
porches without railings. Such things cannot be the safety responsibility
of any contractor; his acts of construction could not change the normal
dangers incident to their use. By distinct contrast, the court mentioned
the special danger beyond what the reasonable person would expect to
find within normal living hazards. The facts presented a
special and concealed danger far beyond any danger incident
to contact with normally hot water; certainly no one, whether he be
adult or child, would have suspected from its appearance that the
water drawn . . .would be at the dangerously high temperature of
190-210 degrees. 57
Note the phraseology of "special and concealed danger far beyond" the
normally expected danger, unusually hot water from a common source.
It cannot be maintained that this danger could not have been discovered
by a reasonable man; it must therefore be a patent danger, certain to be
known by anyone living in the home for any period of time. However,
this was a latent danger when we assume what the reasonable user
would assume, i.e., that the domestic water source was safe for its ob-
viously intended use.
53 97 App. D. C. 310, 231 F. 2d 469, 58 A. L. R. 847 (D. C. C. 1956), cert. den. 351 U. S.
989, 76 Sup. Ct. 1051 (1956).
54 Id. 231 F. 2d at 474.
55 Id. at 473, relying on MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 390, 111 N. E.
1050, 1053 (Ct. App. 1916), which discarded and put aside the notion that duty of
care in safety matters arose solely from contract.
56 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N. J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314, 323 (1965).
57 Id. at 324.
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Thus, the defendant building contractor's acts of installing a mix-
type water fixture and issuing a veiled warning in its homeowner's guide
were not sufficient to overcome the foreseeability of danger to the pri-
mary vendee, his family, guests, and others.
An important concept, not analyzed at this point, involved the im-
mediacy of the danger arising from the negligent construction. In Leigh
v. Wadsworth," which involved the collapse of a back-porch roof more
than two years after construction, the court defined "immediate" to
mean:
where the defect created by a contractor is the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury-immediate and proximate because
there is no intervening cause that may have brought about or direct-
ly contributed to the injury .... 59
It is not an instant or sudden event. These issues of the immediacy and
certainty of danger must be submitted for consideration by the jury.60
In certain jurisdictions, contractor liability for negligence is being
controlled by a general liability statute.6 ' An example is California Civil
Code Section 1714:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person,
except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself.
Existence of such a general statute has not precluded jury consideration
of the prima facie case alleging negligence. 62 Such codification of duty
principles reflects modern awareness of the individual's socio-legal obli-
gations in our complex society. The enacting states are the pioneers in
what will hopefully become a uniformly adopted law.
Regardless of statutes, precedent or liberal interpretation of the
liability trend, the plaintiff's burden of pleading is the establishment of
a prima facie case, proving that the structure was inherently defective
when finished and sold, that in such condition it was unreasonably dan-
gerous, and that the defect proximately caused the injury.
The plaintiff must prove the contractor's negligence and that
such negligence is a proximate cause of his injury; furthermore, he
58 361 P. 2d 849 (Okla. 1961).
59 Id. at 854.
60 Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P. 2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961); Schlender
v. Andy Jensen Co., 380 P. 2d 523 (Okla. 1963); Strandholm v. General Construc-
tion Co., 235 Ore. 145, 382 P. 2d 843 (1963). See also, Thompson v. Burke Engineer-
ing Sales Co., 252 Iowa 146, 106 N. W. 2d 351, 84 A. L. R. 2d 689 (1960).
61 Stout v. Madden & Williams, 208 Ore. 294, 300 P. 2d 461 (1956); Marine Insurance
Co. v. Strecker, 234 La. 522, 100 So. 2d 493 (1958); Day v. National-U. S. Radiator
Corp., 117 So. 2d 104 (La. 1960).
62 Sabella v. Wisler, 23 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1962), vacated and remanded, 59 Cal.
2d 21, 377 P. 2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1963), concerning inadequate land-fill
and subsidence.
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must prove that he is within the class protected, that is, one as to
whom the consequences of negligence may be foreseen.63
He must link the foreseeable injury or damage unequivocally to the de-
fendant's construction.6 4 Where there is little or no actual evidence to
support some of the elements, the plaintiff may apply the Res Ipsa Loqui-
tor Doctrine.6 5 Neither is plaintiff's case foreclosed by the defense's proof
of knowledge of the dangerous condition.60 In the Schipper case,6 7 evi-
dence was introduced that the injured child's parents were aware of the
super-hot water. This did not destroy their cause of action because,
although
they may not have fully appreciated the extraordinary nature
of the risk . .. any omissions or contributory fault on their part
would not preclude a finding that Levitt had been negligent and was
to be held responsible to others who foreseeably might be injured
as a result of its negligence. On the issue of negligence there was
clearly enough evidence to go to the jury.68
Having reviewed the component elements of this liability-imposing
trend, it is time to concentrate on how the most recent cases have treated
such matters. De Tillo v. Carlyn Construction, Inc., 69 involved a home-
owner who experienced cracked walls and ceilings, buckled wall panels,
and floors separated from wall studs as the structure settled and his
back-yard sank within a short time after completion. The evidence estab-
lished that a sewer pipe had burst precipitating an unusual escape of
water which caused underground erosion and, finally, settling. Plaintiff
63 Whorton v. T. A. Loving & Co., 344 F. 2d 739, 746 (4th Cir. 1965).
64 ,.. .The contractor . . . may escape liability under substantive tort law if, for
instance, there is no proof of his negligence, no establishment of the fact that the
injury or damage was foreseeable or that danger from defective construction
would be probable, or no proof that the injury was proximately caused by the
contractor's conduct." Marine Insurance Co. v. Strecker, supra n. 61 at 496,
wherein the court remanded for trial a cause of action for property damage oc-
casioned by an inadequately installed wall cabinet brace bracket.
65 Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Co., 252 Iowa 146, 106 N. W. 2d 351, 84
A. L. R. 2d 689 (1960). Accord, Lee v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 20 Wis. 2d 333, 122
N. W. 2d 374, 378 (1963):
"The direct evidence of negligence does not prevent necessarily the applica-
tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Specific elements of negligence not
reaching the point of a prima facie case which is overcome by other evidence
may be supported by the application of the doctrine."
66 Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S. W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1962).
67 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra n. 56 at 324.
6s Ibid; Accord,
"Today, however, the negligence principle has been widely accepted in
product liability cases; and the bottom does not logically drop out of a negli-
gence case against the maker when it is shown that the purchaser knew of the
dangerous condition . . .it should be a question for the jury whether reasonable
care demanded such a precaution (installation of a guard or safety release),
though its absence is obvious . . .the obviousness of a condition will still pre-
clude liability if the obviousness justifies the conclusion that the condition is
not unreasonably dangerous. . . ." 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5 at 1543 (1956).
69 416 Pa. 469, 206 A. 2d 376 (1965).
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joined the pipe sub-contractor with the land developing contractor-
grantor. An award of $11,500 was affirmed in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court based on the jury finding that the sub-contractor's negligent in-
stallation of the sewer line had been the proximate cause of the damage.
[W]hen it is obvious to the contractor that a third party would
necessarily, in the natural course of events, be brought into contact
with, or would use the defective construction, then the contractor
will be liable for injuries sustained by the third person caused by
the negligence of the contractor.7"
A case from the west, depending on many of the same precedents as
above, was Dorlac v. John Todd, Inc.71 It involved a septic tank con-
tractor who installed two tanks behind the lessor-owner's restaurant
which was leased by plaintiff. Two days after completion and acceptance,
plaintiff fell through the improperly back-filled soil around said tanks.
The evidence clearly established that the contractor's work was so negli-
gently completed and covered over that there were empty spaces around
the top and sides of the tanks. The court remanded the case for trial on
all issues, overruling the prior dismissal.
72
70 Id. at 378. Note that this case involved a pure latent defect which was not subject
to discovery upon even the most thorough investigation. The defect was not in-
fluenced by intervening causes such as faulty repair or lack of it. And there was
no sudden accident or event; the damage was gradual.
71 156 Colo. 271, 398 P. 2d 45 (1965).
72 The decision relied strongly on Krisovich v. John Booth, Inc., 181 Pa. Super. 5,
121 A. 2d 890 (1956). Involved, herein, was the negligent back-filling and tamping
of soil into a public utility trench which crossed a pedestrian walkway. An injured
pedestrian recovered against the negligent contractor under a liberal reading of the
MacPherson Doctrine.
"... Following the Grodstein case (Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154
A. 794), our Supreme court has consistently extended the principle of the
MacPherson case by imposing liability also on any person who on behalf of the
possessor of land negligently creates an artificial condition resulting in injury
to others; and this, regardless of whether the contractor has surrendered pos-
session of the land and his work has been accepted." Id. at 892.
Further precedent was the oft-cited Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N. H. 171,
121 A. 2d 781 (1956). It, too, involved improper filling of an excavation, but no trial
of the facts was had. The parties certified to the highest court the precise question
whether completion and acceptance of the work by the municipal contractee ab-
solved the contractor of all liability. Taking the lead from Prosser on Torts, the
court ruled:
"We adopt the view outlined by Prosser that independent building and con-
struction contractors should be held to a general standard of reasonable care
for the protection of third parties who may be foreseeably endangered by the
contractor's negligence even after acceptance of the work. This rule is subject
to the following qualification:
'... The employer's failure to discover the defect will not relieve the contrac-
tor of liability, but ... if he discovers the danger, or it is obvious to him, his
responsibility supersedes that of the contractor.'" Prosser, Torts § 85 at 519
(2d ed. 1955); and Id. at 782.
The latter clause in § 85 cited above has not been adopted in those jurisdictions
which have seriously adopted the trend. However, it rings of a clear logic by making
the owner in possession the one primarily responsible for correcting with least
effort the obvious defects. A further ruling was that completion and acceptance is
not conditional upon payment in full. Ibid.
(Continued on next page)
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The MacPherson Doctrine has been applied to negligent construction
under the general Maritime Tort Laws.73 In Whorton v. T. A. Loving &
Co.,7 4 this maritime doctrine was applied to negligent removal of bridge
supports which proximately caused the sinking of plaintiff's boat in the
intercoastal waterway. The contractor was tentatively held liable, pend-
ing a retrial of the facts, under the conflict of laws principles which ap-
plied the above Maritime Tort Doctrine instead of the North Carolina
laws which did not follow the MacPherson trend. The court, per dictum,
could find no valid reason for distinguishing between manufacturer's and
contractor's liability and believed direct liability should be invoked.7 5
The old rule of non-liability following completion/acceptance was dis-
placed by the growing weight of authority.
Where a marine boom was negligently remodeled and repaired so
that a cotter key was insecure and caused a block and rigging to give
way injuring plaintiff longshoreman, the Oregon Supreme Court held
that a good cause of action was stated and should have been submitted
to a jury for trial.76 The most important issue confronting the court was
whether the MacPherson Doctrine was applicable in an action between
a third party and the defendant repair contractor for an accident occur-
ring six months after completion and acceptance. They decided that lack
(Continued from preceding page)
Accord, Strothman v. Houggy, 186 Pa. Super. 638, 142 A. 2d 769 (1958), where a
negligently built fireplace mantel gave way causing injury to a child, liability was
imposed upon the builder-lessor after evidence that said mantel was originally in-
adequately secured by too little mortar. This court found within the lease a cor-
responding liability for failure to warn or protect against and prevent injuries from
defects within areas under the lessor's control. The court also strictly construed
the lessor's exculpatory clause which specifically failed to mention injury from
negligent construction. If the parties had intended to release such matters, they
were obligated to do so in more specific terms.
73 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. U. S., 69 F. Supp. 609 (D. C. Maine 1947); The S. S.
Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (D. C. N. D. Calif. 1947); Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co.,
Inc., 149 F. 2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1945); aff'd., Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S.
85, 66 Sup. Ct. 872 (1946).
74 344 F. 2d 739 (4th Cir. 1965).
75 Id. at 745. Accord: The Wonder, 79 F. 2d 312 (2d Cir. 1935), where a contractor
was held liable for negligently laying a power cable across a draw bridge. Injury
occurred five months after completion and acceptance.
Further support for the Whorton decision is found in Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 166 F. 2d 908 (3rd Cir. 1948). Following the East Ohio Gas catas-
trophe in which a faulty cylinder of liquified natural gas gave way, an action on
behalf of the deceased's estate was instituted against the designing engineers and
builders. This court held that a good cause of action had been stated on the ques-
tions of negligent construction raising the defendant's liability following completion
and acceptance. Said cause should be submitted to the jury.
"One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition thereon is subject to liability to others within or without the
land for bodily harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the struc-
ture or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor under the
same rules as those stated in (Restatement, Torts) §§ 394 to 398, 403-404 as de-
termining the liability of one who as manufacturer or independent contractor
makes a chattel for the use of others." Id. at 916.
76 Strandholm v. General Construction Co., 235 Ore. 145, 382 P. 2d 843 (1963).
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of privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant was no defense. 7 7
It was believed that as much liability should apply to the contractor as
the courts currently apply to a manufacturer under MacPherson.78 If
there were any intervening causes between the negligent work and in-
jury, it would be up to the jury to determine whether the original tort-
feasor should thereby be absolved of liability.79
A companion Oregon case 0 involved property damage one and one-
half years after acceptance of a newly-constructed grocery warehouse.
The insurance company, having paid for the damages, proceeded success-
fully against the general contractor and sprinkler system sub-contractor.
The affirming court stated:
A builder owes the other party to his contract a contractual
duty to construct the building in a good, workmanlike manner. He
also owes those who foreseeably will use the building a duty not to
build into the building defects that will cause harm to the users.
The probability of harm resulting from pouring concrete walls on a
water pipe without protecting the pipe is not so remote that we can
rule out, as a matter of law, the duty to guard against such harm.8
Joinder of parties defendant and their liability for a faulty terrazzo
entranceway into a retail store were the issues in Prost v. Caldwell
Store, Inc. 2 Judge Musmanno, in granting a joinder of the owner-
contractee with the general and sub-contractors, refused to follow the old
rule of non-liability because to do so would result in an absolution of
those building contractors who were the most flagrant violators of the
duty not to create a lurking danger.8 3 That duty is blatantly violated
77 Id. at 849. Accord, Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A. 2d 517
(1949); American Reciprocal Insurers v. Bessonette, 235 Ore. 507, 384 P. 2d 223, 385
P. 2d 759 (1963).
78 "It is difficult to see any distinction between a person who manufactures goods of
a particular kind for general sale to the public, such as an automobile manu-
facturer, and one who builds or manufactures a particular chattel made for a
precise use. In fact, when one builds for a particular use and knows how and
by whom the product will be used the matter of foreseeability would seem to be
more acute than would be true of one who manufactures for general use and for
many purposes. It appears futile to determine liability by attempting to find if a
particular function were that of a contractor or a manufacturer .... It would
appear better to determine liability by conduct, not by a label to be attached to
the actor." Strandholm v. General Construction Co., supra n. 76 at 848.
79 Id. at 849-850. Also, American Reciprocal Insurers v. Bessonette, supra n. 77.
80 American Reciprocal Insurers v. Bessonette, 235 Ore. 507, 384 P. 2d 223, 385 P. 2d
759 (1963), aff'd. 241 Ore. 500, 405 P. 2d 529 (1965). The first reported decision denied
as a defense lack of privity of contract between the contractor and the corporate
tenant. It also stressed the importance of lapsed time between the acts and the
damage, i.e., intervening cause, as a jury question.
81 Id., 405 P. 2d at 532.
82 409 Pa. 421, 187 A. 2d 273 (1963). Owner is often joined where his conduct is
doubtful under issue of causation.
83 Id. at 276, where it is alleged that faulty material, workmanship, and method of
construction created an overly slippery terrazzo public walk-way. Accord, Bisson
v. John B. Kelley, Inc., 314 Pa. 99, 170 A. 139 (1934).
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when any defendant fails to guard against a foreseeably dangerous con-
dition.8 4
Texas overruled the completion and acceptance rule in a well rea-
soned case8 5 involving abandoned and unmarked post-holes along a high-
way. It was reasoned that there was no logic behind a rule which pinned
liability on a contractor before completion and eliminated it the day
after.
The retention of the "accepted work" doctrine would inevitably
yield the same unwieldly results as have come about in virtually
every other jurisdiction that has formally adhered to the rule.
The rule eventually becomes enveloped by complex exceptions to
cover such situations as nuisance, hidden danger, and inherently
dangerous conditions. The result would be that in each case, after
having first decided that there was an acceptance of the work, we
would then have to decide issues involving all the various excep-
tions to the rule and in case any exception were found applicable,
the basic issues of negligence and proximate cause would still re-
main for consideration. 6
No better statement of the old rule's inadequacies could be made.
It will mark our transition into an analysis of Ohio law.
Ohio
Adherence to the majority rule of non-liability after completion and
acceptance8 7 has meant that only rarely has an injured third party re-
covered under negligence principles; and then, only from the property
owner. For instance, in a 1930 appellate case,8 8 a factory owner was
found liable for permitting a one-sixteenth inch projection to exist on
the edge of one step of its stairway which had been rebuilt and accepted
six days prior to the accident. Adjudged a dangerous condition, liability
was based upon acceptance of the defective work and failure to correct
while it existed.
84 Id. at 277. Accord,
"Even though the owner (of the premises) actually had accepted the work,
the defendant still owed a 'social-legal' duty to users of the sidewalk and he
was properly charged with negligence in failing to anticipate and guard against
a foreseeable dangerous condition created by him." (Cement contractor com-
pletes a sidewalk with obstruction injurious to a pedestrian.) Bastl v. Papale,
142 Pa. Super. 33, 15 A. 2d 476, 478 (1940).
85 Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S. W. 2d 787 (Tex. 1962). The holes were 3 feet deep and
covered by grass and weeds. Those involved in the injury happened to be near a
well-traveled farm access gate.
86 Id. at 791.
87 Sumner v. Lambert, 96 Ohio App. 53, 121 N. E. 2d 189 (1953), where a trenching
subcontractor was not liable for an injurious cave-in following his completion and
its acceptance by the general contractor because the total circumstances of the
situation did not fall within an exception to the general rule of non-liability. See
also, 28 Ohio Jur. 2d, Independent Contractors § 35.
88 Toledo Factories Co. v. Stapleton, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 121 (1) (Ct. App. 1930).
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The MacPherson Doctrine with the latent defect concept has been
adopted and applied but only as to chattels.8 9 This has meant that
knowledge of a defect will be inferred from a manufacturer's awareness
of accidents involving his products.90 Once a chattel becomes incorpo-
rated into building construction, the above rules are adhered to strictly
with the result that real property equipment is controlled by chattel doc-
trines contorted to fit the situation.
In the 1966 case of Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.91 an allegedly
defective steel roof joist which was secured in place to the horizontal
structural steel girders comprising the erected building framework was
characterized as a chattel. The Ohio Supreme Court, promptly applying
products liability concepts, recognized three possible causes of action:
(1) in tort for negligence, (2) in contract, and (3) in tort for breach of
a representation of merchantable quality and fitness for intended use.92
Because this case involved an employee of a sub-contractor against the
steel manufacturer, the court had to resort to the Toni Home Permanent
case93 to overcome the privity concept94 inherent in action #3. It went
on to say that
prior to the time of the recognition of an action for breach of
warranty based on contract, there existed the action for breach of
warranty in tort. This "kind of warranty" arose not out of a con-
tract of sale but out of the duty of a manufacturer or seller of a
product to protect the person consuming or using that product in
the ordinary way in which it was intended to be used from the harm
of injury to person or property caused by a defect in the product. It
is a failure to distinguish between these two different kinds of war-
ranties that has caused confusion in the law, and, in our modern-day
mass-production and mass-distribution industrial system, this has
resulted in some of the unjust technical decisions based upon out-
moded and irrelevant concepts of privity.9 5
89 48 Ohio Jur. 2d, Sales § 157. See also Burns v. Pennsylvania Rubber & Supply Co.,
117 Ohio App. 19, 189 N. E. 2d 645 (1961). This case involved the explosion of a
service station hydraulic lift. The defendant was the retailer and manufacturer of
the lift mechanism.
90 Findlay Brewing Co. v. Bauer, 50 Ohio St; 560, 35 N. E. 55 (1893).
91 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N. E. 2d 185 (1966).
92 Id. at 229-230.
93 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958).
94 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., supra n. 91 at 233-236. Accord, Inglis v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N. E. 2d 583 (1965), which extended the tort
action based on breach of warranty from personal injury to property damage.
95 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., supra n. 91 at 233-234.
The warranty concept based on contractual principles has been codified in the Uni-
form Sales Act and Uniform Commercial Code. However, the trend has been away
from these in order to re-establish the tort action for breach of warranty.
"The recognition of such a right of action rested on the public policy of pro-
tecting an innocent buyer from harm rather than on the ensuring of any con-
tractual rights." Haman v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 716, 174 A. 2d 294, 296 (1961).
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Note that the words "duty of a manufacturer . .. to protect the person
... using that product in the ordinary way in which it was intended to be
used from the harm of injury to person or property caused by a defect
. . ." convey the same duty concept applied to builder-vendors in the pre-
vious section. It is a tragicomedy that our highest court, so close to an
outright statement of the trend, labors over such a pronouncement about
a "chattel" affixed to the land.
The extent of the warranty implied in the sale was held to stem from
the term good and merchantable quality: that defendant's product was
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such product was to be used.9 6
Because of the above, plaintiff had stated a good cause of action under
breach of warranty.9 7 If he decided to take his case to a jury the ele-
ments for a prima facie case would be:
(1) that the joist was defective,
(2) that it was defective at the time the defendant-manufacturer
sold it,
(3) that such defect caused the collapse while it was being used for
the ordinarily intended purpose,
(4) that the defect was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury, and
(5) that plaintiff's presence was in a place which defendant could
have reasonably anticipated.98
Since there had been no trial, the three-man dissent9 9 concentrated its
objection upon the nearly strict liability this decision imposes; a develop-
ment in other jurisdictions which have so interpreted this warranty.1' °
96 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., supra n. 91 at 235-236. Ohio Revised Code
§ 1302.27: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . . are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used," was discussed, but its influence
on the decision is debatable.
97 "The petition in this case states a good cause of action grounded in tort, based
upon a breach of the representations which are implicit when a defendant manu-
factures and sells a product, which if defective, will be a dangerous instru-
mentality." Id. at 240.
98 Id. at 237. Any paucity of evidence for elements (1) and (2) would necessitate
resorting to the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine.
99 Id. at 240-252.
100 "In imposing liability upon manufacturers to ultimate consumers in terms of
implied warranty even though no privity exists, the courts have used a con-
venient legal fiction to accomplish this result. Ordinarily, there is no contract
in a real sense between a manufacturer and an expected ultimate consumer
of his product. As a matter of public policy, the law has imposed on all manu-
facturers a duty to consumers irrespective of contract or of privity relationship
between them. The search for correct principles to delineate manufacturer's re-
sponsibility to consumers has found expression in the doctrine of tort and strict
liability. The 'strict tort liability' doctrine is 'surely a more accurate phrase'
than breach of implied warranty of suitability for use." Mitchell v. Miller, 26
Conn. Sup. 142, 214 A. 2d 694, 697 (1965). Accord, Wights v. Staff Jennings Inc.,
241 Ore. 301; 405 P. 2d 624, 629 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
12 N. Y. 2d 432, 437, 240 N. Y. S. 2d 592, 191 N. E. 2d 81 (1963).
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Accompanying this growth is the test of foreseeability, 1°0 the same test
applied to contractors under the new trend. As we learn to recognize
how inadequate and strained the old concepts have been, the sooner will
our courts overcome their timidity to apply negligence concepts of duty
of care and foreseeability to cases like Lonzrick.
Could Ohio develop its own contractor liability rule without lifting
the MacPherson lid further? Yes, under a progressive expansion of an
exception to its prevailing rule of non-liability. For example, a District
of Columbia court 10 2 held a builder-vendor liable for his negligent con-
struction which was the proximate cause of injury to the vendee-owner
who fell from his exterior wooden stairway three months after taking
possession. It was established that the defendant had inadequately and
defectively attached the bottom of these stairs to a concrete platform so
that as the earth settled, the platform and stairs became separated, caus-
ing the latter to hang and swing loosely. This liability concept, encom-
passing the vendee and his invitees, was couched in terms of undiscover-
able defect but without relying on MacPherson 0 3
Is there an easier method without distorting logic with expanded
exceptions? Has a doctrine placing liability upon the building contractor
ever been analyzed in Ohio? It clearly was in 1948 in Moran v. Pitts-
burgh-Des Moines Steel Co. 0 4 This court, after establishing that the
MacPherson Doctrine had been adopted and applied to chattels'05 and
extended beyond the ultimate consumer to those reasonably within its
101 "The trend toward applying the doctrine of strict liability in the case of an
injury arising from the manufacture of a product which may be unreasonably
dangerous and from which the likelihood of injury arising from its use is rea-
sonably foreseeable is expanding. Foreseeable or reasonable anticipation of in-jury from the defect is becoming the test. Reliance on representations or notice
of injury are no longer absolute conditions precedent." Mitchell v. Miller, supra
n. 100 at 698. This case indicates an abandonment of contract and sales principles
for establishment of tort liability.
102 Caporaletti v. A.-F. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D. D. C. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
240 F. 2d 53 (D. C. Cir. 1957).
103 ". . . this court will adopt and apply the principle that a builder who defectively
constructs a house, is liable to the purchaser or any other invitee, for personal
injuries sustained by the latter, if the defect could not have been discovered on
inspection by the ordinary man in the street. In this case, the builder must be
charged with knowledge of his own negligence. The defect was of such a char-
acter that only a person skilled in the details of building construction could
have discovered it and realized its significance. Under the circumstances, the
court is of the opinion that the builder and vendor should be held liable for
personal injuries caused to the purchaser, or any invitee as a result of this
negligence." Id. 137 F. Supp. at 19.
On appeal, this decision was reversed and remanded to the lower court for trial on
the grounds of error in failure to instruct the jury on negligence, especially the
element of proximate cause.
104 166 F. 2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948), cert.. den., 334 U. S. 846, 68 Sup. Ct. 1516 (1948)
involving the negligent design and construction of a liquified natural gas storage
cylinder which exploded 13 months after completion and acceptance.
105 White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N. E. 633 (1927); Dow
Drug Co. v. Neiman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N. E. 2d 130 (1936).
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ambit of use,106 could not find a case applying the Doctrine to real estate
construction. Therefore, it had to rely on the Restatement'0 7 when it said
The Ohio decisions cited and discussed in this opinion cite,
quote, and follow fully the analysis of the problem of liability as it
is set out in the Restatement of Torts. We have no doubt that an
Ohio court confronted with the question would, in accordance with
the development of the law, shown in its previous decisions, extend
the liability of the manufacturer to negligence involved in building
a structure even though that structure was affixed on another's
land."'
A concurrent cause of action, founded upon the same catastrophe,
decided in Pennsylvania, illuminates this new extension with a degree of
logic brilliant and prophetic for its grasp of the basic concept.
[I]t would obviously be absurd to hold that a manufacturer would
be held liable if negligent in building a small, readily movable tank
which would undoubtedly be a chattel, but not in building an enor-
mously large and correspondingly more potentially dangerous a one
that legalistically was classified as realty. The principle inherent in
the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. case and those that have fol-
lowed it is that one who manufactures and delivers any article or
structure with the knowledge that it will be subjected to use by
others, must, for the protection of humftn life and property, use
proper care to make it reasonably safe for such users and for those
who may come into its vicinity; certainly the application of that
principle cannot be made to depend upon the merely technical dis-
tinction between a chattel and a structure built upon the land.10 9
Regardless of its wisdom, regardless of the subsequent case opportu-
nities, Ohio has lacked the jurisprudential spirit to extend MacPherson
to contractors through the logic of Moran. It had a factually perfect op-
portunity in a 1959 case 10 involving a defective fire escape on which an
employee of a roofing contractor was injured. Although the jury found
the fire escape contractor and building owner guilty of negligence, which
was the proximate cause of the collapse, the court would not take the
state precedents farther than they had previously gone.
On the first question [privity of contract], the court applied the
law as laid down by the Court of Appeals of New York in the case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co .... As to the second point, with
reference to the lapse of time between the installation and the acci-
dent, that question was submitted to the jury as a question of fact.
106 Gilbride v. James Leffel & Co., 47 N. E. 2d 1015 (Ohio App. 1942), involving neg-
ligent manufacture of a boiler; White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel, Ibid.
107 Restatement, Torts §§ 385, 394 to 398, 403, 404 (1934).
108 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., supra n. 104 at 916.
109 Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A. 2d 517, 533 (1949).
110 Cornett v. Ficks Reed Co., 87 Ohio L. Abs. 567, 172 N. E. 2d 183 (1959), affirmed
as to defendant contractor, Cornett v. Wm. Lang & Sons Co., 175 N. E. 2d 105 (Ohio
App. 1960).
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The doctrine of the MacPherson case has never been squarely
decided by the Supreme Court of this state to be the law of Ohio."'
This, then, represents Ohio's uncertain and indefinite protection of the
third party from building contractor negligence. How does the vendee
fare under the same problem?
The most exhaustive and exemplary decision for this analysis is
Mitchem v. Johnson. 12 Here, a vendee is seeking property damages from
his home-builder-vendor for poor workmanship and construction causing
roof leaks, flooding, and inoperative septic tank and toilets. The flooding
and inoperative sewage system were caused by the builder's failure to
install subterranean drain tiles which would have compensated for the
low topography of the lot. The leaking was from improper construction
with inferior roofing and insulating materials, all conditions undetectable
at the moment of deed conveyance.
In a 7 to 0 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
reversal of the lower court holding for the plaintiff vendee. It remanded
the case for trial, not on warranty grounds, but upon the builder's rea-
sonable workmanlike conduct under all the circumstances.1 1 3 These ju-
rists evolved a most liberal decree by their resort to tort phraseology of
duty of care and hidden defect. 1 14 It is extraordinarily similar to the
MacPherson trend and may presage the foundation necessary for a
change.
The concept of "implied warranty of fitness for intended use" was
specifically not applied" because the court refused to go beyond the
terms of the express warranties and would not extend any warranty be-
yond the time period intended. However, it is this warranty which is the
11 Cornett v. Ficks Reed Co., supra, n. 110, at 185-6.
112 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N. E. 2d 594 (1966).
113 "The trial court confused the operative effect of a warranty, even though implied
by law, with the duty historically imposed by law upon all persons that they
measure their conduct by that of the ordinarily prudent person under all the
circumstances, which include the risk of harm from the natural and probable
consequences of the conduct. We do not understand that a builder of structures
on real estate is relieved of that duty any more than any other person in what-
ever capacity he may act." Id. at 72.
Defendant, on retrial, is to be permitted to take to the jury evidence of his good
workmanship and use of proper materials having taken into consideration the risks
of harm within the area.
114 "A duty is imposed by law upon a builder-vendor of a real-property structure
to construct the same in a workmanlike manner and to employ such care and
skill in the choice of materials and work as will be commensurate with the
gravity of the risk involved in protecting the structure against faults and haz-
ards, including those inherent in its site. If the violation of that duty proximately
causes a defect hidden from revelation by an inspection reasonably available to
the vendee, the vendor is answerable to the vendee for the resulting damages."
Paragraph 3 of Syllabus (statement of law), Mitchem v. Johnson, supra n. 112.
115 Mitchem v. Johnson, supra, n. 112, at 70. Contra, Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103
Ohio App. 340, 140 N. E. 2d 819 (1957), which involved defective sewage lines in a
newly completed residence. The builder-vendor was held liable under the implied
warranty of fitness for intended use.
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most appropriate in those cases where completion follows a signed pur-
chase contract. A well-reasoned exposition of this appeared in the 1966
decision of Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Cooperative Ele-
vator Co."8
This we believe to be an appropriate case for extending to con-
struction contracts the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness for
the purpose, under circumstances where (1) the contractor holds
himself out, expressly or by implication, as competent to undertake
the contract; and the owner (2) has no particular expertise in the
kind of work contemplated; (3) furnishes no plans, design, specifi-
cations, details or blueprints, and (4) tacitly or specifically indicates
his reliance on the experience and skill of the contractor, after
making known to him the specific purposes for which the building
is intended." 7
Once applied these four factors would establish an expanded sphere of
builder liability with greater protection for the innocent vendee. But
the Mitchem court, not being so inclined, justified its denial of implied
warranty by resurrecting a concept which insures the vendee's impotence
and constricts the builder's liability into a nearly impregnable sanctuary.
[T]he doctrine of caveat emptor is so ingrained in our custom-
ary real estate transactions that few, if any, attempts have been
made to pierce the shield of protection from specious claims of de-
fect which it affords to vendors, not only of older buildings but of
newly completed structures. It may also indicate that real estate
buyers generally experience little difficulty in securing express war-
ranties or guaranties if they are insistent....
In any event, the rule of caveat emptor is firmly anchored in the
fact that the purchase of real estate is invariably preceded by a
lengthy period of inspection, consideration and negotiation. One
does not purchase land under conditions in any way similar to the
purchase of home permanents (citation), cooking appliances (cita-
tion), soap (citation), or electric blankets (citation)."'
With arch conservatism we have stepped back into the 19th century to
deny every warranty except those expressed. Unequivocally, this deci-
sion tells the buying public that it is too bad that they cannot go over
an entire structure in a Sherlock Holmes fashion (as they do with cook-
ing appliances!) or that they can never avoid problems with building
116 143 N. W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1966), which involved the faulty construction of a grain
storage building.
117 Id. at 626. See Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa 118, 123, 106 N. W. 2d 59, 62 (1960),
which involved improper warehouse construction:
"In building and construction contracts, in the absence of an express agree-
ment to the contrary, it is implied that the building will be erected in a reason-
ably good and workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for the intended
purpose."
118 Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 71-72, 218 N. E. 2d 594, 598 (1966); See
Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N. E. 2d 175 (1955), wherein the plaintiff-
vendee inspected the unfinished home with an experienced carpenter.
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construction. True as this may be, why perpetuate it at the vendee's
expense?
[T]o apply the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer
and in favor of a builder who is daily engaged in the business of
building and selling homes, is manifestly a denial of justice." 9
This was said by a court which permitted a vendee to rescind his con-
tract because the home was unsuitable for habitation. It did so by in-
voking the implied and minimizing the express warranties.
[A] buyer who has no knowledge, notice, or warning of de-
fects, is in no position to exact specific warranties. Any written war-
ranty demanded in such a case would necessarily be so general in
terms as to be difficult to enforce.' 2 0
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.121 went further and put caveat emptor
into the modern context of mass sales through mass advertising. Under
these conditions, the buyer can no longer carefully inspect or avoid the
high pressure tactics and form contracts.1 22
When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised
model . . .he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its
implied representation that the house will be erected in reasonably
workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation. He
has no architect or other professional advisor of his own, he has no
real competency to inspect on his own, his actual examination is in
the nature of things, largely superficial, and his opportunity for ob-
taining meaningful protective changes in the conveyancing docu-
ments prepared by the builder-vendor is negligible. If there is im-
proper construction such as a defective heating system or a defec-
tive ceiling, stairway and the like, the well-being of the vendee and
others is seriously endangered and serious injury is foreseeable. The
public interest dictates that if such injury does result from the de-
fective construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible de-
veloper who created the danger and who is in the better economic
119 Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P. 2d 698, 710 (Idaho 1966).
120 Id. at 707; See also, Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults
upon the Rule, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 541, 574 (1961):
"The vendee's strongest argument is reliance. He is admittedly unskilled in
the mysteries of house construction and must therefore rely heavily upon the
superior skill and training of his builder-vendor. Inspection will be of little
use .... in protecting the vendee, both because of the expense and because the
defects are usually hidden. Though the vendor-vendee relationship may not be
technically a fiduciary one, the trust placed in the vendor coupled with the
relative helplessness of the vendee makes it one, . . .on which the law should
impose that high standard."
Support for the above line of thinking is found in 7 Williston, Contracts §§ 926, 926
(A) (3d ed. 1963). Advocating an exception to caveat emptor, Prof. Jaeger stated
• .. it would be much better if this enlightened approach were generally adopted
with respect to the sale of new houses for it would tend to discourage much of the
sloppy work and jerry-building that has become perceptible over the years."
§ 926 (A) at 818.
121 44 N. J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314 (1965).
122 Id. at 324-325.
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position to bear the loss rather than by the injured party who justi-
fiably relied on the developer's skill and implied representations. 123
Neither can he protect himself through his deed. 124 Faced with this en-
vironment, it is time that Ohio realized that its primitive doctrine cannot
cope with contemporary issues.
Now it cannot be overlooked that an impenetrable status has been
welded around the building contractor. Unknowing vendees must pierce
the sheaths of warranty and caveat emptor, then try to fit their cause
into one of the numerous completed work exceptions, of which there are
as many variants as inventive legal minds. And, the third party is as im-
potent when confronted with the completion and acceptance bulwark.
Thus a third party, if within the protected class, is forced to proceed
agaijist the owner-vendee for a breach of duty involving a condition
originally created by the builder. This course is completely absurd where
the vendee can recover because the implied warranty survives the deed.
The duty of care concept presupposes that a vendee in possession knows
of the harmful condition and has the power to carry out corrections. But
the opposite is true where the complexities of the defect mix with igno-
rance to make it unrecognizable or hidden. Therefore, it is illogical to
impose liability for harmful defects the vendee has not expressly as-
sumed, over which he exercises no conscious control, and for which the
builder is impliedly liable under warranty. Giving a right of recovery
to the vendee is to acknowledge that he is not the primary tort-feasor for
a condition that was harmful to a third party.
It is time we recognized these conditions and the builder's defenses
for what they are: illogical and unjust. By enforcing them, the courts
have impliedly encouraged negligent work. Only through an ascendancy
123 Id. at 325-326; Accord:
"Conditions have radically changed since the origin of the general common-law
rule. Homes are being constructed on a large scale by persons engaged in the
building business for the purpose of selling them to individual owners. The
ordinary purchaser is not in a position to discover a latent defect by inspection,
no matter how thorough his scrutiny may be, because usually he lacks sufficient
familiarity with the complexities of building construction and the intricacies of
applicable regulations. He should be able to rely on the skill of the builder who
sells the house to him. Otherwise he would be at the vendor's mercy. The
realities of modern life necessarily lead to the conclusion that the builder should
be liable for injuries caused by his negligence under such circumstances, either
to the purchaser or to an invitee. Any other result would be unjust and in-
tolerable. It would encourage unscrupulous builders who may be tempted to
reduce their costs and increase their profits by palming off defective and inferior
construction on their customers." Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14, 16
(D. D. C. 1956); rev'd on other grounds, 240 F. 2d 53 (D. C. Cir. 1957).
124 ".. . caveat emptor developed when the buyer and seller were in an equal bar-
gaining position and they could readily be expected to protect themselves in the
deed. Buyers of mass produced development homes are not on an equal footing
with the builder-vendors and are no more able to protect themselves in the deed
than are automobile purchasers in a position to protect themselves in a bill of
sale." Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra, n. 121, at 326.
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of the concept of the duty of care for completed construction will we
right the tipped scales of justice.
Projection
Hopefully, the time is not distant when the ancient rule of comple-
tion and acceptance, together with its intricate exceptions, will be dis-
placed by a "General Rule of Liability" under the new trend evolved
from the MacPherson Doctrine. It will be easier to apply, more narrowly
construed,125 and inherently curbed by the burden of the prima facie
case.
Adoption can be expected to have several manifest effects. While
forcing the contractor to absorb and spread out the costs of injury into
his future projects, it may ignite a countervailing effort toward raising
the quality of construction. The building industry, severely constrained
by its unions, has been the last hold-out against new methods and quality
control standards. Yet, only through unitized materials, automatic tools,
and pre-assembled components can it institute safety controls126 com-
mensurate with the risks involved. This must be recognized as one an-
swer to MacPherson.
Another possibility would be repeated returns of the contractor to
the completed project for thorough examination and repairs. This would
eliminate those defects uncovered through use, but is extremely expen-
sive. For the smaller contractors, whose cost and profit structure is very
narrow in today's overly competitive market, such a step would be pro-
hibitive. Protection in the form of extended coverage insurance, similar
to that of manufacturers, 127 may be the only immediate answer.
During the period of transition the legal community should concen-
trate its attention upon the landowner's defense. One device is the in-
125 Thornton & McNiece, Torts (American Survey), 33 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 165, 175
(1958). The liberality of the multiple exceptions under the rule of non-liability is
so widespread that the rule itself is more nearly a categorizing tool for the vast list
of cases under each exception. Nothing will stop this short of a complete re-
definition of the rule within a modern context.
126 Gas-fired machinery and electrically-powered built-ins should have safety in-
spections before and after installation; not simply a working test. All gas, water,
and electrical connections must be tested by modern mechanical methods common
in manufacturing processes. Continual on-site inspections of critical points of stress
and weight-bearing should be conducted by the engineer, architect, and general
contractor to verify durability, trustworthiness, and completion. Approval by the
building inspector, often the only test, is no longer adequate. His municipal code
and ability are far below the standard of care being invoked.
A contractor cannot exculpate himself for negligent construction by relying on
the building inspector's approval of concrete caissons. Fireman's Insurance Co. v.
Indermill, 182 Cal. App. 2d 339, 6 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1960).
127 7A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 4508 (1962). Although such insurance
must protect the manufacturer against millions of nationwide users, the liability
period would be circumscribed by the use-life of the product. Whereas, although
the contractor's completed product may have a limited number of users, it will exist
for 25 to 40 years.
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demnification agreement with the contractor. Of greatest importance in
drafting is the inclusion of an expressed right of recovery for negligently
created latent defects; 128 otherwise, the terms will be strictly and nar-
rowly construed. Also there would be no rights of indemnity involving
an owner's non-delegable statutory duty,'1 29 his actual or constructive
notice of the existence of a dangerous condition, 130 or for his conduct
which amounts to legal acquiescence therein. 131 Insurance for the owner
in possession should be a logical consideration since the builder-vendor
will have divested himself of all rights in the property, including re-
entry for either inspection or repair."3 2
Attention-is needed on the statute of limitations, where a redefinition
would clarify the uncertainty about the duration of liability.133 There
will always be doubts about this area of mixed tort-contract-property
concepts when cases are decided against a contractor seven years after
completion.13 4 It has been suggested 135 that the builder-contractor insti-
tute a one year warranty period for defective construction and a six year
statutory period for uncovering latent defects. There is much logic in
this, especially where a practitioner must produce evidence of due care
even after five years of constant use.
The profession should not overlook the irony of the problems elicit-
ing such projected changes. These and other latent defects will be un-
covered only after the new trend has been adopted.
128 Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N. Y. 2d 137, 164 N. Y. S. 2d 699, 704-
705 (1957). Negligent elevator repairs present a complex contract terminology prob-
lem. See Beinhocker v. Barnes Development Corp., 296 N. Y. 925, 73 N. E. 2d 41
(1947).
129 Glasgow v. Mable Drakes, et al., 6 (N. Y.) Misc. 2d 830, 161 N. Y. S. 2d 635 (Sup.
Ct. Kings Co. 1957); Rufo v. Orlando, 309 N. Y. 345, 130 N. E. 2d 887 (1955).
130 Harrington v. 615 West Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 435, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 564 (1956),
modified, 2 N. Y. 2d 476, 141 N. E. 2d 602 (1957).
131 Such acquiescence puts the landowner in pari delicto with the active tort-feasor,
Stabile v. Vittullo, 280 App. Div. 191, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (1952).
132 "... insurance has been an important factor in many of the cases involving ex-
tensions of tort liability. It is extremely unlikely, however, that after selling the
property a vendor would continue insurance coverage against liability such as
plaintiffs seek to visit upon ... [defendant] in this case .... On the other hand,
the person who does own the property can conveniently insure himself against
liability to third persons." Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc., 55 N. J. Super.
475, 151 A. 2d 48, 53 (1959).
133 "As to both of these exceptions under which the vendor is held liable for injuries
occurring after possession is transferred, it seems obvious that there must be
some time limit upon the duration of the potential liability. A corporation, still
in existence, can scarcely be required to pay for damages which occur a century
after the grant. There are, however, very few cases which have considered the
question. . . ." Prosser, Torts § 63 at 410 (3rd ed. 1964).
Accord, four years were too long as reasonable time for vendee to discover, Tri-
Boro Bowling Center v. Roosevelt Eighty-Fifth St. Estates, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 74. (Sup.
Ct. 1947); discovery of fraud, Pavelchak v. Finn, 153 N. Y. S. 2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1956),
aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 841, 176 N. Y. S. 2d 933 (1958).
134 Hanna v. Fletcher, 97 App. D. C. 310, 231 F. 2d 469, 58 A. L. R. 2d 847 (D. C.
Cir. 1956), cert. den., 351 U. S. 989, 76 Sup. Ct. 1051 (1956).
135 Note, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 343.
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